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[PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________
No. 98-6598
________________________

FILED

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
11/30/99
THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK

D. C. Docket No. CV-96-D-1875-N
MARTHA SANDOVAL, individually
and on behalf of all others similarly situated,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
versus
L. N. HAGAN, in his official capacity as
Director of the Alabama Department of
Public Safety, and ALABAMA
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY,
Defendants-Appellants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama
_________________________
(November 30, 1999)
Before HULL and MARCUS, Circuit Judges, and RONEY, Senior Circuit Judge.
MARCUS, Circuit Judge:

Martha Sandoval, on her own behalf and as the representative of others
similarly situated (“Appellees”), filed this lawsuit against the Alabama Department
of Public Safety and its director L.N. Hagan, in his official capacity (“Appellants”),
challenging the lawfulness of the Department of Public Safety’s (“Department”)
official policy of administering its driver’s license examination only in the English
language. Appellees specifically alleged that the policy constituted discrimination on
the basis of national origin in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42
U.S.C. § 2000d to 2000d-4 and its implementing regulations, as well as the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as secured by 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and
42 U.S.C. § 1983. After a bench trial, the district court entered a permanent injunction
prohibiting the Department’s enforcement of the English-only policy pursuant to
Section 602 of Title VI, and ordered the Department to make reasonable
accommodations for non-English speakers who applied for a driver’s license.
Appellants broadly challenge the district court’s order on three grounds: first,
the lawsuit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; second, Section 602 of Title VI
does not contain an implied private cause of action; and finally, an English-language
policy cannot constitute unlawful national origin discrimination as a matter of law.
After thoroughly reviewing the record and parties’ briefs, we affirm the district court’s
judgment.
2

I.
The factual and procedural history surrounding this case are straightforward,
uncontroverted, and laid out fully by the district court. Alabama, like almost every
other state, historically has administered the written part of its Class D driver’s license
exam in a variety of foreign languages. From the 1970s to 1991, the Department
administered the exam in at least fourteen foreign languages, including Spanish,
Korean, Farsi, Cambodian, German, Laotian, Greek, Arabic, French, Japanese, Polish,
Thai, and Vietnamese.
However, on July 13, 1990, an English-only Amendment to the Alabama
Constitution was ratified. Amendment 509 states:
English is the official language of the state of Alabama.
The legislature shall enforce this amendment by appropriate
legislation. The legislature and officials of the state of
Alabama shall take all steps necessary to insure that the role
of English as the common language of the state of Alabama
is preserved and enhanced. The legislature shall make no
law which diminishes or ignores the role of English as the
common language of the state of Alabama.
Any person who is a resident of or doing business in the
state of Alabama shall have standing to sue the state of
Alabama to enforce this amendment, and the courts of
record of the state of Alabama shall have jurisdiction to
hear cases brought to enforce this provision. The
legislature may provide reasonable and appropriate
limitations on the time and manner of suits brought under
this amendment.
3

Approximately one year later, the Department adopted an English-only policy,
requiring all portions of the driver’s license examination process, including the written
exam, to be administered in English only. Interpreters, translation dictionaries, and
other interpretive aids were officially forbidden. However, the Department’s official
policy still continues to provide special accommodations for illiterate, hearingimpaired, deaf, and disabled applicants. Notably, the Department also permits nonEnglish-speaking drivers from other states and foreign countries to exchange a valid
out-of-state license for an Alabama license without taking the written exam.
Eight months after the implementation of the Department’s English-only policy,
the Department requested an opinion from Alabama’s Attorney General regarding
“whether Amendment No. 509 . . . prohibits the Department from giving license tests
in any language other than English.” The opinion concluded that Amendment 509
required all applicants for driver’s licenses to take the examination in English.
Although the opinion candidly acknowledged that the English-only policy “might be
a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, or the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment, consideration of safety and integrity of the licensing
process would, [in the words of the opinion], support a requirement that driver
licensing examinations be given in English.”
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On December 31, 1996, Martha Sandoval, on her own behalf and as the
representative of others similarly situated, filed suit in the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Alabama against the Alabama Department of Public Safety,
and its Director L.N. Hagan.1 She sought a judgment declaring the Appellants’
practice unlawful and unconstitutional, and permanently enjoining Appellants from
continuing to test only in English.2
On September 3, 1997, the magistrate judge recommended that the district court
grant Sandoval’s motion to certify a plaintiff class. The Department did not object,
and on October 17, 1997, the district court certified the class, naming Sandoval as the
representative of the class of “all legal residents of the State of Alabama who are
otherwise qualified to obtain a Class D private vehicle driver’s license but cannot do
so because they are not sufficiently fluent in English.” Soon thereafter, Hagan and the
Department moved for summary judgment, which the district court denied, concluding

1

Sandoval’s original complaint omitted Director Hagan from the Title VI claim but the
district court granted Sandoval’s Motion for Leave to Amend the Complaint which added Hagan as
a named defendant.
2

We construe Appellee’s suit to be based on 49 C.F.R. 21.5(b) (2) (Department of
Transportation) and 28 C.F.R. 42.104 (b) (2) (Department of Justice) which require recipients of
federal funds to not “directly, or through contractual or other arrangements, utilize criteria or
methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting [individuals] to discrimination on the
basis of their race, color, or national origin.” Appellants concede that these agency implementing
regulations are valid exercises of agency authority under Section 2000d-1.
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that “the issues raised are more amenable to disposition after a full legal and factual
exploration at trial.”
This case was tried to the court on February 17 and 18, 1998. At its close, the
district court granted, with the full agreement of Appellees, Appellants’ motion for
judgment as a matter of law on Appellees’ claim that the policy was adopted as a
pretext for discrimination and that the Department intentionally discriminated on the
basis of national origin. In addition, the district court granted Appellants’ motion for
summary judgment on Appellees’ Section 1981 claims, finding that those claims were
duplications of their Section 1983 claims.
Thereafter, the district court entered a memorandum opinion and order, ruling
in Appellees’ favor on their claim arising under Title VI’s disparate impact
regulations. The court enjoined Appellants from enforcing the English-only policy
and directed the Department to “fashion proposed policies and practices for the
accommodation of Alabama’s non-English-speaking residents who seek Alabama’s
driver’s licenses.”
The district court made a series of factual findings that are undisputed on
appeal. According to its findings, the Department receives more than one million
dollars in federal funds every year from the United States Department of
Transportation and the Department of Justice. The district court also determined that
6

thousands of Alabama residents of foreign descent suffer adversely from the
Department’s English-only policy. Dr. Donald Bogie, Director of the Center for
Demographics and Cultural Research at Auburn University, presented demographic
and census evidence estimating that some 13,000 adult Alabama residents “would
have difficulty in obtaining an Alabama driver’s license because of the Department’s
English-only policy.” Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1297.3 The “vast” majority of this
group are of foreign descent. Id. at 1283.
The district court also heard unrefuted testimony that spoke to the

3

Doctor Bogie’s demographic statistics were drawn from Bureau of Census reports. His
analysis took into account several factors: (1) census and demographic figures for non- or limitedEnglish-speaking Alabama residents; (2) projections of census undercounting for these groups; (3)
growth rate projections for these groups; and (4) the primary languages spoken by these groups at
home. See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1295-97. Dr. Bogie explained:
The census findings indicate that from 1980 to 1990, the number of
Alabama residents aged 18 years or older who "did not speak English
well" or "did not speak English at all" more than doubled. In the
1980 census, 4,287 persons aged 18 years or older indicated that they
"did not speak English well" or "did not speak English at all." In the
1990 census, the number was 10,158-- an increase of 136.9 percent.
If the same rate of increase is maintained throughout the 1990's, there
will be a projected 24,069 adult Alabama residents in the year 2000
who will not be proficient in English.
See id. Many of these non-English speakers are of foreign descent and census figures project that
this Alabama demographic subgroup will increase in number significantly in the coming years. The
Bureau of Census projects that the number of Hispanics aged 15 or older will increase by 10,227
during the 1990's (a gain of 61.3 percent), and that during the years 2000 to 2010, the Hispanic state
population is estimated to grow 32.4 percent (a gain of another 8,715 persons). Additionally, the
Asian and Pacific Islander state population is estimated to grow by 55 percent (a gain of 9,238
persons) during the 1990's and by 32.2 percent during the years 2000 to 2010 (a gain of another
8,300 persons). See id.
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individualized impact of the policy on Alabama residents of foreign descent.
Directors Brenda Bullock of the Hispanic Ministry of the Catholic Diocese of
Birmingham and Floria Salazar of the Hispanic Ministry of the Catholic Diocese of
Mobile testified that they knew of “hundreds” of adult residents of foreign descent
who did not read or speak English fluently, and, as a result, are unable to obtain an
Alabama driver’s license. See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1291-92. Ms. Salazar
herself knew of three hundred such adults, many of whom consequently drive without
a license. She also testified that not having a license often affected the ability of these
adults to obtain employment, child care services, and other life essentials. See id.4
The district court also heard evidence outlining how the Department made
special exam accommodations for other statutorily-protected groups but no
accommodations for non-English speakers. Under official state policy, hearingimpaired, illiterate, deaf, and disabled residents receive substantial accommodation
on the written exam and road skills test. See id. at 1287-89. Illiterate English
speakers may take the test orally from a state examiner. Illiterate deaf applicants may
make appointments to take the exam in sign language. See id. For those hearing4

The trial record also contains affidavits from Perla Raines, Secretary of the Montgomery
Annex of the Catholic Hispanic Ministry in Montgomery, Alabama, and Boyd F. Campbell, a local
lawyer and Chairman of the International Assistance Project of Alabama, a non-profit organization
that helps non-citizens adapt to life in Alabama, attesting to their personal knowledge of adult
residents of foreign descent unable to obtain driver’s licenses in Alabama. See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.
at 1292.
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impaired applicants, who cannot adequately read and write English, a video exam is
offered. See id. Additionally, the Department also grants driver’s licenses to
applicants of foreign descent who possess valid driver’s licenses from other states or
countries. These applicants are not required to pass the English-only written exam in
order to obtain a state license. See id. at 1289-90. Finally, two members of the class,
Martha Sandoval and Lorenzo Leon, testified about the policy’s deleterious impact on
their own lives. See id. at 1293-94. Sandoval is a permanent resident alien from
Mexico who now lives in Mobile, Alabama. She speaks and understands a very
limited amount of English, and cannot read a book in English. Spanish is her primary
language. Leon is a permanent resident alien from Mexico who also resides in
Mobile, Alabama. His primary language also is Spanish and he understands and
speaks only a limited amount of English.
On the basis of this evidence, the district court found that the state policy
exerted an adverse and disproportionate impact on non-English-speaking residents
who applied for an Alabama driver’s license. The court concluded that Appellants’
English-only policy “singles out resident non-English speaking applicants by
requiring them to take their examination in English only, without the aid of
interpreters or translators.” Id. at 1290.
The district court also reviewed each asserted state justification for the English9

only driver’s exam policy. The state offered six rationales for the English-only policy:
(1) Amendment 509's requirement, (2) highway safety concerns, (3) administrative
accommodation concerns, (4) exam integrity concerns, (5) funding concerns, and (6)
English is the official language of the United States. The district court found that none
of the proffered rationales were “‘substantial legitimate justifications.’” See id. at
1297 (quoting Elston v. Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th
Cir. 1993)).
On appeal, Appellants do not contest any of the district court’s findings with
respect to these proffered reasons. Among other things, the district court rejected
four of the state’s principal justifications:

(1) highway safety, (2) exam

administration, (3) exam integrity, and (4) budgetary constraints. First, the court
noted that the state produced no evidence at trial that non-English speakers posed
greater highway safety risks than English speakers. See id. at 1300. Harold
Hammond, second-in-command of the Department from 1987 to 1991, and Chief of
the Department’s Driver’s License Division from 1978 to 1987, testified that he was
aware of no such evidence from the time of his tenure with the Department. See id.
Further, the court concluded that the State undermined its own safety rationale
through a policy of honoring valid licenses from non-English speakers of other
locales, and making test accommodations for illiterate, deaf, and disabled drivers-10

although these groups might pose theoretically greater safety risks than other
population subgroups. See id.
Second, the court also found the exam administration and integrity rationales
meritless. Trial evidence indicated that, for over a decade, the Department had offered
the written exam in fourteen foreign languages without any administrative difficulty.
See id. at 1302.

Trial testimony from department personnel confirmed this

conclusion. See id. The trial court discounted the validity of exam cheating as a
significant concern. See id. at 1307-08.
Finally, the district court discerned that the Department could afford to
accommodate non-English speakers within its budgetary limits. The court credited
trial testimony stating that financial constraints were not a decisionmaking factor
behind the Department’s English-only policy. See id. at 1313. Trial evidence also
established that the Department, prior to the English-only policy, had been able to use
volunteer translators, and obtain exam translations at no cost. See id. At trial, the
Department was unable to demonstrate that a return to this policy was not feasible.
The district court also determined that even if the Department could not afford
translators, other alternatives, like audio-taped instructions or allowing applicants to
pay for or provide their own translators, were readily available. See id. Finally, the
district court found that the annual budget for the Department was $50 million dollars,
11

and that it could afford to hire some professional translators. See id. at 1312-13
(finding that translator costs would be minimal). The court concluded that all of these
rationales were a pretext, specifically crediting testimony that the Department never
had considered ending the translation policy prior to Amendment 509's ratification.
See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1313.
Pursuant to the district court’s order, a stay pending appeal was entered in
exchange for Appellants’ implementation of a plan for testing in languages other than
English. Appellants agreed to procure translations of the examination into Spanish,
German, Korean, Japanese, French, Mandarin Chinese, and Vietnamese.
On June 17, 1998, Appellees filed a Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment,
requesting that the district court either rule in their favor on their equal protection
claim or expressly reserve ruling on that claim. The district court granted Appellees’
motion and reserved ruling on the equal protection claim.
On July 28, 1998, Appellants timely filed a notice of appeal.
II.
We review the district court’s conclusions of law de novo. See Motorcity of
Jacksonville, Ltd. v. Southeast Bank, 83 F.3d 1317, 1323 (11th Cir. 1996) (en banc),
vacated on other grounds, Hess v. FDIC, 117 S. Ct. 760 (1997). Findings of fact,
however, may not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
12

52(a); DeKalb County Sch. Dist. v. Schrenko, 109 F.3d 680, 687 (11th Cir. 1996).
The entry of a permanent injunction is reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Simmons
v. Conger, 86 F.3d 1080, 1085 (11th Cir. 1996).
On appeal, Appellants do not challenge the district court’s factual findings, its
use of Title VII disparate impact principles to analyze Appellants’ Title VI claims, or
its formulation of the disparate impact analyses. Instead, Appellants make only three
broad claims: first, the suit is barred by the Eleventh Amendment; second, Section 602
of Title VI does not contain an implied private cause of action; and finally, an English
language policy cannot discriminate on the basis of national origin as a matter of law.
We address each claim in turn.
III.
Eleventh Amendment
The Eleventh Amendment to the United States Constitution states: “The
Judicial Power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law
or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of
another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend.
XI. The Amendment also equally bars suits against a state commenced by that state’s
own citizens. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1, 13-15 (1890). Further, the Amendment bans suits against state officials
13

where the state, in fact, is the real party in interest. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp.
v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 101 (1984) [hereinafter Pennhurst II]. In general, these
bans prohibit federal courts from exercising subject matter jurisdiction over private
party suits filed against a state or state officials.
However, three exceptions to this constitutional bar have been recognized by
the Supreme Court. First, individual suits may proceed directly against a state if a
state waives its sovereign immunity. See Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S.
234, 238 (1985). Second, individual suits against a state also may be adjudicated if
Congress, pursuant to a valid exercise of congressional power, abrogates a state’s
immunity through a clear statement of its intent to abrogate. See Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 55 (1996). Finally, individual suits that seek
prospective relief for ongoing violations of federal law also may be levied against
state officials. See Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159-60 (1908).

In the instant

case, Appellees sued both the Department and its Director, L.N. Hagan, in his official
capacity. On appeal, Appellants contend that even if Title VI accords Appellees an
implied cause of action, the Eleventh Amendment bars this particular suit on
sovereign immunity grounds. They contend that Appellees’ suit is barred as it relates
to both the Department and Director Hagan. Specifically, Appellants present three
arguments: first, the Department’s acceptance of federal funds does not constitute a
14

waiver of state immunity under the Spending Clause power; second, Title VI does not
comprise a valid congressional abrogation of state immunity under Section Five of the
Fourteenth Amendment; and finally, the Ex Parte Young doctrine does not apply to
Director Hagen.
A.
Waiver
It is an “unremarkable” commonplace that states may waive their sovereign
immunity through overt consent. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 65; see also Cate v.
Oldham, 707 F.2d 1176, 1183 n.4 (11th Cir. 1983). It is equally true that a state may
waive its sovereign immunity by accepting federal funds. Under the Spending Clause
power of Article I, Congress is empowered to "lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts,
and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general
Welfare of the United States." Art. I, § 8, cl. 1. As the Supreme Court repeatedly has
recognized, “[i]ncident to this power, Congress may attach conditions on the receipt
of federal funds . . . ‘to further broad policy objectives by conditioning receipt of
federal moneys upon compliance by the recipient with federal statutory and
administrative directives.’" South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 207 (1987) (citations
omitted). Moreover, the Spending Clause power is substantial and Congress may
accomplish “objectives not thought to be within Article I’s ‘enumerated legislative
15

fields’ . . . through the use of the spending power and the conditional grant of federal
funds.” Dole, 483 U.S. at 208 (quoting United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 66
(1936)). Specifically, under the Spending Clause power, the federal government may
condition a waiver of state sovereign immunity upon the receipt of federal monies.
See Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 238 n.1 (noting that “a State may effectuate a waiver of
its constitutional immunity. . . by otherwise waiving its immunity in the context of a
particular federal program”); Edelman, 415 U.S. at 672 (noting that a state may waive
immunity “by its participation in [a] program authorized by Congress”). However,
a Spending Clause waiver requires an “unequivocal indication” that a State has
consented to federal jurisdiction-- either “‘by the most express language or by such
overwhelming implication from the text as (will) leave no room for any other
reasonable construction.’” Edelman, 415 U.S. at 673 (quoting Murry v. Wilson
Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909)). To satisfy this “clear statement” waiver
requirement, a statute must evince a “clear intent to condition participation in the
programs funded under the Act on a State’s consent to waive its constitutional
immunity.” Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
Neither side disputes that Title VI, as amended by Section 2000d-7 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, explicitly waives state sovereign immunity for Title VI
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suits in accordance with the Atascadero waiver formula.5 Passed a year after
Atascadero was decided, the provision reads in relevant part: “[A] State shall not be
immune under the Eleventh Amendment . . . from suit in Federal Court for a violation
. . . of Title VI . . . or the provisions of any other Federal statute prohibiting
discrimination by recipients of Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-7
(emphasis added). The provision’s plain language manifests an unmistakable intent
to condition federal funds on a state’s waiver of sovereign immunity. The Supreme
Court has reached this conclusion, describing Section 2000d-7 as an “unambiguous
waiver of the States’ Eleventh Amendment immunity.” See Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S.
187, 200 (1996) (drawing this conclusion in the context of a parallel Title IX
provision). Indeed, every federal circuit that has considered this issue also has found
5

Appellants, however, contend that this abrogation statement applies only to Title VI and not
to its accompanying administrative regulations promulgated under Section 602. This claim is
without merit. There is no evidence that Congress somehow differentiated between suits to enforce
the statute and suits to enforce the regulations promulgated thereunder when it constructed its
abrogation/waiver provision. See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1272. The Title VI regulations at issue
were promulgated pursuant to the statute’s unambiguous directive to federal agencies contained in
42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. These regulations “effectuate the provisions of Section 2000d”--the statutory
prohibition against discrimination--and are not separate from the statute. See Lau v. Nichols, 414
U.S. 563, 566-69 (1974). Moreover, when Section 2000d-7 was passed, Congress already had
rejected efforts to rescind the disparate impact regulations, and “with full awareness of how agencies
were interpreting Title VI, ha[d] modeled later statutes on § 601 of Title VI, thus indicating approval
of the administrative definition.” Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 593 n.14.
(1983) (Marshall, J.). From these factors, it is plain that Congress intended Section 2000d-7 to
abrogate state immunity with respect to both the statutory provisions and administrative regulations
of Title VI. Several lower district courts have reached similar conclusions. See Bryant v. New
Jersey Dept. of Transp., 1 F. Supp.2d 426, 431-35 (D.N.J. 1998) (rejecting Eleventh Amendment
defense to suit brought entirely under Title VI regulations); Grimes v. Sobol, 832 F. Supp.2d 704,
707 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (same), aff’d, 37 F.3d 857 (2d Cir. 1994).
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Section 2000d-7 to constitute a “clear statement” waiver of state sovereign immunity
in exchange for the receipt of federal funds. See Little Rock v. Mauney, 183 F.3d
816, 821-22 (8th Cir. 1999) (finding Section 2000d-7 to constitute an immunity
waiver for Section 1403 of the IDEA, a parallel provision to the Title VI waiver);
Marie O. v. Edgar, 131 F.3d 610, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1997) (same); Clark v. California,
123 F.3d 1267, 1271 (9th Cir. 1997), cert. denied, 118 S. Ct. 2340 (1998) (finding
Section 2000d-7 to constitute a state immunity waiver for Section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a parallel provision to the Title VI waiver); see also
Beasley v. Alabama State Univ., 3 F. Supp.2d 1304, 1307-16 (M.D. Al. 1998) (finding
Section 2000d-7 to be a valid waiver under the Spending Clause power for Title IX
suits after detailed analysis and discussion).
The recognition of a “clear statement” Spending Clause waiver also is
consonant with recent doctrinal developments in sovereign immunity. The Supreme
Court has reaffirmed the constitutionality of conditioning federal funds upon the
waiver of state sovereign immunity. In College Savings, the Court analogized federal
monies to “gifts” that a state may accept or reject of its own accord. See College
Savings v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 119 S. Ct. 2219, 2231
(1999). The Supreme Court also recognized that “Congress may, in the exercise of
its spending power, condition its grant of funds to the States upon their taking of
18

certain actions that Congress could not require them to take, and that acceptance of the
fund[s] entails an agreement to the actions,” so long as the conditions placed on these
funds are not so “coercive” as to eviscerate the “voluntariness of [the] waiver.” Id.
(citation omitted); see also Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood Sch. Dist., 469 U.S.
256, 269-70 (1985) (remarking that “it is far from a novel proposition that pursuant
to powers under the Spending Clause, Congress may impose conditions on the receipt
of federal funds absent some independent constitutional bar”); Autery v. United
States, 992 F.2d 1523, 1527 n.7 (11th Cir. 1993) (noting that “those who seek federal
financial assistance, whether it be states, non-profit organizations, or individuals, have
a choice whether to participate in a federal program. But once that decision to
participate is made, the grant recipient is bound by any mandatory rules imposed by
federal law.”).
Unlike the Commerce Clause power, see Art. I sec. 8, cl. 2, the Spending Clause
power does not abrogate state immunity through unilateral federal action. Rather,
states are free to accept or reject the terms and conditions of federal funds much like
any contractual party. See Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,17
(1981) [hereinafter Pennhurst I] (noting that “legislation enacted pursuant to the
spending power is much in the nature of a contract: in return for federal funds, the
States agree to comply with federally imposed conditions”). In this way, conditioning
19

federal funds on an explicit state waiver of sovereign immunity does not violate
bedrock principles of federalism. As the Supreme Court delineated in New York,
Congress may offer financial incentives to induce state action so long as “Congress
encourages state action rather than compelling it.” New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 168 (1992). Inducements rather than abrogations leave “the ultimate
decision as to whether or not the State will comply” in the hands of the State and its
citizens rather than the federal government. Id.; see also Bell v. New Jersey, 461 U.S.
773, 790 (1983) (“[r]equiring States to honor the obligations voluntarily assumed as
a condition of federal funding . . . simply does not intrude on their sovereignty”).
Therefore, we can find no constitutional defect inherent in the explicit state immunity
waiver enacted pursuant to the Spending Clause in Section 2000d-7.
Nevertheless, Appellants argue that although they have continued to accept
federal funding after the effective date of Section 2000d-7, their grant agreements with
the Department of Transportation and Department of Justice fail to obligate Alabama
to administer driver’s license exams in foreign languages. Appellants claim that
because Title VI is Spending Clause legislation, see Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of
Educ., 120 F.3d 1390, 1398-99 (11th Cir. 1997) (en banc) (describing Title VI as
Spending Clause legislation for statutory construction purposes), rev’d on other
grounds, Davis v. Monroe County Bd. of Educ., 119 S. Ct. 1661 (1999), they are
20

entitled to explicit notice that accepting federal funds prohibits them from requiring
exam applicants to take an English language driver’s exam. We are not persuaded
by Appellants’ claim that they were provided insufficient notice of their obligations
under Title VI.
As discussed earlier, Spending Clause legislation functions as a quasi-contract
between Congress and the States. See Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17. Under this
financial arrangement, Congress may attach conditions on those states who accept
federal funds-- provided “‘Congress speak[s] with a clear voice’” in outlining its
conditions. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1670 (quoting Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17). In
determining whether a statute and its accompanying administrative regulations
provide recipient states with the requisite level of notice for imposing funding
conditions, we rely on traditional methods of statutory construction. See School Bd.
of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 286 n.15 (1987). However, once Congress
clearly signals its intent to attach federal conditions to Spending Clause legislation,
it need not specifically identify and proscribe in advance every conceivable state
action that would be improper. Bennett v. Kentucky Dep’t of Educ., 470 U.S. 656,
666-69 (1985) (noting that federal grant programs cannot prospectively resolve every
possible “ambiguity” concerning particular applications of their statutory
requirements).
21

In this case, Alabama received ample notice of its nondiscrimination obligations
under Title VI. Title VI flatly prohibits discrimination on the basis of national origin
and, in turn, English language policies that cause a disparate impact on the basis of
national origin. Section 601 of Title VI forbids discrimination based on “national
origin, in any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000d (emphasis added). Section 602 of the Act also grants federal agencies like
the Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice the authority to issue
rules and regulations to ensure that recipients of federal aid “conduct any federally
financed projects consistently with Section 601.” Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 566
(1974). The Supreme Court consistently has held that recipients of federal funds must
comply with Title VI’s nondiscrimination mandate as well as the statute’s
implementing regulations as promulgated by federal administrative agencies. See id.
at 570-71 (Stewart, J., concurring). Moreover, agency regulations are accorded
substantial deference in assessing whether they outline a permissible construction of
a congressional statute’s purpose. See Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources
Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984); United States v. Board of
Trustees for the Univ. of Alabama, 908 F.2d 740, 746-47 (11th Cir. 1990).
In this case, a number of federal agencies articulated implementing regulations
for Title VI, plainly notifying recipient states like Alabama of their duty not to engage
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in policies causing a disparate impact based on national origin. Department of
Transportation and Department of Justice regulations prohibit grant recipients from
employing “criteria or methods of administration which have the effect of subjecting
[individuals] to discrimination because of their . . . national origin.” 49 C.F.R.
21.5(b)(2) (DOT); 28 C.F.R. 42.104(b)(2) (DOJ) (same). Indeed, the Department of
Justice, the principal federal agency for coordinating Title VI requirements,6 also has
promulgated a longstanding regulation instructing all executive agencies on when
grant recipients must provide foreign language assistance:
Where a significant number or proportion of the population
eligible to be served or likely to be directly affected by a
federally assisted program (e.g., affected by relocation)
needs service or information in a language other than
English in order effectively to be informed of or to
participate in the program, the recipient shall take
reasonable steps, considering the size and concentration of
such population, to provide information in appropriate
languages to such persons. This requirement applies with
regard to written material of the type which is ordinarily
distributed to the public.
28 C.F.R. 42,405(d)(1) (1976) (emphasis added). Moreover, other federal agencies
also have adopted longstanding positions that the denial of benefits to non-English
6

When Congress entrusts more than one federal agency to enforce a statute, the Supreme
Court has accorded wide deference to the regulations promulgated by the agency charged by
Executive Order with coordinating government-wide compliance. See Consolidated Rail Corp. v.
Darrone, 465 U.S. 624, 634 (1984). In this case, the Department of Justice has been authorized by
Executive Order to coordinate government-wide compliance with Title VI. See Exec. Order No.
11,247, 30 Fed. Reg. 12327 (1965); Exec. Order No. 12250, 45 Fed. Reg. 72, 995 (1980).
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speakers may yield a disparate impact based on national origin in violation of Title
VI.7

Notably, Appellants do not contest these longstanding federal agency

interpretations of Title VI.
Moreover, the Supreme Court specifically has read Title VI and its
implementing regulations to prohibit English language policies which yield a disparate
impact on non-English speakers. In Lau, a large group of Chinese-speaking minority
students were denied supplemental English language instruction by the San Francisco
school system. Regulations promulgated by the Department of Health, Education, and
Welfare (“HEW”) under Section 602 of Title VI required:
Where inability to speak and understand the English
language excludes national origin-minority group children
7

The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (“HEW”), the predecessor to the
Department of Education (“DOE”), issued a 1970 policy memorandum informing that “[w]here [the]
inability to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group
children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school district, the
district must take affirmative steps . . . to open its instructional program to these students.” 35 Fed.
Reg. 11,595 (1970). As recently as last year, the Department of Health and Human Services
(“HHS”) issued a guidance memorandum stating that “[t]he United States is . . . home to millions
of national origin minority individuals who are limited in their ability to speak, read, write, and
understand the English language [and that] [b]ecause of these language barriers, [limited English
proficiency (LEP)] persons are often excluded from programs or experience delays or denials of
services from recipients of Federal assistance.” The memo concluded that “[w]here such barriers
discriminate or have had the effect of discriminating on the basis of national origin, OCR [the Office
of Civil Rights] has required recipients to provide language assistance to LEP persons. U.S. Dept.
of Health and Human Services’ Office of Civil Rights Memorandum, Title VI Prohibition Against
National Origin Discrimination–Persons with Limited English Proficiency, at 1-2 (1998) (emphasis
added); see Sandoval 7 F. Supp.2d at 1282. Since 1980, the agency “has conducted a large number
of complaint investigations and compliance reviews in this area. In these cases, OCR [the Office
of Civil Rights] has consistently concluded that recipients have an obligation under Title VI to
communicate effectively with persons of limited English proficiency.” 45 Fed. Reg. 82,972 (1980).
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from effective participation in the educational program
offered by a school district, the district must take
affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency in order
to open its instructional program to these students. . . Any
ability grouping or tracking system employed by the school
system to deal with the special language skill needs of
national origin-minority group children must be designed
to meet such language skill needs as soon as possible and
must not operate as an educational deadend or permanent
track.
Id. at 568.
Based on the validity of these regulations as an interpretation of the substantive
meaning of Title VI, the Supreme Court found the school district’s language policy
to clearly violate Title VI. See id. at 568; id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). The
Supreme Court explained:
[I]t seems obvious that the Chinese-speaking minority
receive fewer benefits than the English-speaking majority
from respondents’ school system which denies them a
meaningful opportunity to participate in the educational
program–all earmarks of the discrimination banned by the
[HEW] regulations.
Id. at 568. Further, the Supreme Court determined that the HEW regulations properly
attached nondiscrimination conditions to funding recipients under the Spending
Clause power. Id. at 568-69 (finding that “the Federal Government has power to fix
the terms on which its money allotments to the States shall be disbursed,” and that as
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a result, “[r]espondent school district contractually agreed to ‘comply with title VI of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 . . . and all requirements imposed by or pursuant to the
Regulation of HEW”) (quoting Oklahoma v. United States Civil Service Comm’n, 330
U.S. 127, 142-43 (1947)). Rejecting the claim that the school lacked proper notice of
its Title VI obligations, the Supreme Court concluded that “whatever may be the
limits of [the Spending Clause] power, they have not been reached here.” Lau, 414
U.S. at 569. The Lau decision subsequently was ratified by Congress in its Education
Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-380, §§ 105, 204, 88 Stat. 503-512, 515
(codified at 20 U.S.C. 1703(f), and Bilingual Education Act, 20 U.S.C. 7401 et seq.).8
Therefore, Lau and its subsequent legislative history also unambiguously notify state
recipients of federal funds that English language policies, which cause a disparate
impact on the ability of non-English speakers to enjoy federal benefits, may violate
Title VI.9
8

These enactments adopted the holding of Lau and provided funds to aid local school
districts in providing bilingual education to comply with Lau and Title VI. See 20 U.S.C.
7402(a)(15) (stating that the “Federal Government as exemplified by Title VI of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 . . . has a special and continuing obligation to take appropriate action to provide equal
educational opportunities to children and youth of limited English proficiency”); Casteneda v.
Pickard, 648 F.2d 989, 1008 (5th Cir. 1981) (noting that Congress subsequently adopted the
“essential” holding of Lau in the Education Amendments of 1974 and the Bilingual Education Act).
9

Appellants contend that Lau is inapposite because the decision merely required
supplemental English language instruction for Chinese-American students, and did not mandate that
the school district “speak in foreign tongues” to the students. In fact, the Lau court thrust no specific
remedy on the district. The Supreme Court found that the district had to take “affirmative steps” to
rectify the language-oriented disparate impact but left the district’s remedial options flexible. The
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This conclusion is altogether consonant with our approach to other federal civil
rights provisions. In Arline, the Supreme Court rejected a Pennhurst I lack of notice
claim with respect to Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See id. at 286 n.15. The
Court found that the Act’s legislative history combined with its implementing
administrative regulations adequately notified recipient states of their statutory
obligations not to discriminate. See id.10 Following Arline, our circuit has read
federal antidiscrimination statutes similarly in evaluating whether they provide
sufficient notice to recipient states. We have looked both to a statute’s legislative
history and subsequently-promulgated implementing regulations in assessing the
breadth of a statute’s funding conditions. In Board of Trustees, for example, we
Court explained:
No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English to the
students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is one
choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another.
Id., 414 U.S. at 564-65. We interpret this instruction as an order to the school district to remedy the
disparate impact by the most efficacious means available-- leaving the ultimate policy choice to the
expert opinion of the district’s educators. Similarly, here, the district court found Appellants’
English-only policy to exert a disparate impact based on national origin, and ordered Appellants to
“fashion proposed policies and practices for the accommodation of Alabama’s non-English speaking
residents who seek Alabama driver’s licenses.” No specific policy has been mandated by the district
court, and Appellants have yet to submit a compliance proposal. We therefore deem it premature
to speculate on the appropriateness of potential court-imposed remedies.
10

The Arline Court explained, “[i]n Pennhurst ... the statutory provisions were thought to
be only statements of 'findings' indicating no more than a congressional preference--at most a 'nudge
in the preferred directio[n.]' The contrast between the congressional preference at issue in Pennhurst
and the antidiscrimination mandate of § 504 could not be more stark.” Arline, 480 U.S. at 280 n.15
(quoting Pennhurst I, 451 U.S. at 17).
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interpreted Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 to provide notice to the
States that they could be required to provide and pay for interpreters for deaf persons.
See Board of Trustees, 908 F.2d at 750. There, we concluded that despite “Section
504's general language and sparse legislative history,” it was reasonable for HEW to
interpret the statute, through implementing regulations, to require state interpreters for
the deaf as a “related service” under the Act. Id. at 748.11 With Title VI, there is an
even clearer legislative purpose of remedying pervasive discrimination.12
11

In reaching this result, we noted that administrative agency constructions of a statute are
entitled to substantial deference. See id. (citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843; Arline, 480 U.S. at 279).
As a result, we deferred to an agency interpretation to determine the breadth of the
antidiscrimination provision at issue. We explained, “HEW's decision that the provision of
interpreters is necessary to comply with the non-discrimination mandate of Section 504, and does
not amount to an affirmative action requirement, is a policy choice that HEW is empowered to
make.” Board of Trustees, 908 F.2d at 749 (stating that “‘[t]he power of an administrative agency
to administer a congressionally created ... program necessarily requires the formulation of policy and
the making of rules to fill any gap left ... by Congress.’") (quoting Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843)
(citation omitted)). The Supreme Court employed a similar approach in Irving. There, the Court
held that under the Education of the Handicapped Act, it was appropriate to rely on agency
regulations in determining the breadth of the “related” services that the states were bound to provide.
See Irving Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-92 & n.8 (1984).
.
12

The legislative record is replete with descriptions of Title VI as a remedial statute. For
example, Senator Hubert Humphrey, the Senate manager of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, explained
that the objective of Title VI was to “make sure that the funds of the United States are not used to
support racial discrimination.” 110 Cong. Rec. 6544 (Statement by Sen. Humphrey). Senator
Pastore made the point more directly:
That is why we need Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, H.R. 7152– to
prevent such discrimination where Federal funds are involved. . . .
Title VI is sound; it is morally right; it is legally right; it is
constitutionally right. . . . What will it accomplish? It will guarantee
that the money collected by colorblind tax collectors will be
distributed by Federal and State administrators who are equally
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Moreover, this nondiscrimination purpose is supplemented by multiple
administrative agency regulations expressly associating disparate impact English
language policies with national origin discrimination. In fact, there was evidence that
Alabama possessed actual notice that the English-only policy violated Title VI. As
we have noted, the Alabama Attorney General issued an advisory opinion on the
English-only state amendment which warned that “requiring an ability to understand
English as a requirement to participate in some state programs might be a violation of
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1286.
Nevertheless, Appellants argue that Title VI does not require federal grantees
to refrain from implementing English-only policies, citing two circuit court cases,
Gloor, a Fifth Circuit case with binding force on our circuit’s case law,13 and Spun
Steak, a Ninth Circuit case, for this proposition. Both cases are inapposite. In Gloor
and Spun Steak, bilingual plaintiffs brought Title VII suits asserting that English-only
workplace policies constituted a disparate impact based on national origin. See Garcia

colorblind. Let me say it again. The title has a simple purpose–to
eliminate discrimination in federally financed programs.
110 Cong. Rec. 7054 (1964) (Statement by Sen. Pastore). See also Guardians, 463 U.S. at 591-92
(White, J.); id. at 620-22 (Marshall, J.); id. at 643-45 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Blackmun, J.); Lau,
414 U.S. at 570.
13

Decisions by the Fifth Circuit prior to September 30, 1981 constitute binding precedent in
our circuit. See Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981).
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v. Gloor, 618 F.2d 264 (5th Cir. 1980); Garcia v. Spun Steak, 998 F.2d 1480 (9th Cir.
1993). While both courts rejected these claims, their decisions rested on the bilingual
status of the plaintiffs. As bilingual speakers, the plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse
impact from being required to speak in English while at work. See Gloor, 618 F.2d
at 270-71; Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1490. Notably, this case does not involve bilingual
speakers but rather license applicants not proficient in the English language at all. As
the Gloor court distinguished, “to a person who speaks only one tongue or to a person
who has difficulty using another language than the one spoken in his home, language
might well be an immutable characteristic like skin color, sex, or place of birth.” Id.
at 270. Under Gloor’s dicta, plaintiffs, like Martha Sandoval, could bring a disparate
impact suit under Title VI. See id. Nothing in Gloor suggests otherwise.14 In short,
14

Appellants also rely on Gebser. In Gebser, the Supreme Court ruled that a school district
receiving federal funding under Title IX could not be held liable for money damages resulting from
a teacher’s sexual harassment of a student in the absence of actual notice and deliberate indifference
on the part of the district. See Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1998-99
(1998). Gebser is distinguishable; notably, it involved monetary liability arising from the actions
of an unauthorized third party. In contrast, this case involves only injunctive relief for official state
policy. Further, the Gebser Court specifically distinguished its case posture from situations
involving “official policy of the recipient entity.” See id. at 1999. The Supreme Court never has
held that a state must have actual notice of its policy’s unlawfulness to be liable for injunctive relief.
In fact, the Court specifically has authorized injunctive relief under Title VI despite the fact that
“where discrimination is unintentional, ‘it surely is not obvious that the grantee was aware that it
was administering the program in violation of the [condition].’” Id. at 1998 (quoting Guardians, 463
U.S. at 598). Additionally, injunctive relief does not carry quite the same liability consequences as
compensatory relief. At bottom, notice is a fairness argument; namely, a defendant did not know
that his conduct was unlawful or harmful, and therefore should not be forced to remunerate the
plaintiff. Injunctive relief involves no compensation. It requires a defendant to stop its unlawful
activity. For this reason, the Supreme Court has distinguished between injunctive and compensatory
relief in terms of the applicable notice standard. Compensatory relief requires actual notice. See
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Appellants had “adequate” notice that their English-only driver’s license exam
requirement violated Title VI. Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1664 (concluding that Spending
Clause legislation only must provide recipient states with “adequate” notice).
We therefore hold that the Alabama Department of Public Safety by voluntarily
accepting these federal monies has waived any claim of sovereign immunity from
individual Title VI suits. Appellees’ suit is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment
against the State of Alabama.15
B.
Ex Parte Young
Even if the Eleventh Amendment barred Appellees’ action against the State of
Alabama--and we do not believe it does--Appellees’ suit, as it relates to Director
Hagan, in his official capacity, still could proceed, and Appellees still could obtain
injunctive relief against the Department’s English-only exam policy. Since Ex Parte
Young, suits directed against state officials that seek prospective relief for continuing
violations are not barred on Eleventh Amendment grounds. See Ex Parte Young, 209

Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1999; Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1664. Injunctive relief based on an implied cause
of action only requires “adequate” notice. See Davis, 119 S. Ct. at 1664, 1670-71; Guardians, 463
U.S. at 598. These differences render Gebser and Davis inapposite.
15

Because we hold that Alabama properly waived its sovereign immunity by receiving
federal funds from the Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice, we need not
address Appellants’ congressional abrogation claim.
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U.S. 123 (1908). This doctrinal exception to state sovereign immunity is wellestablished. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 269 (1997)
(reaffirming that a plaintiff seeking prospective relief against a state official’s ongoing
violation of federal law can proceed in federal court); Summit Medical Assoc. v.
Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336-38 (11th Cir. 1999) (same). The doctrine prohibits state
officers from enforcing state policies in violation of the Constitution or federal law
under a legal “fiction” that “creates an imaginary distinction between the state and its
officers, deeming the officers to act without the state’s authority, and hence, without
immunity protection, when they enforce state laws in derogation” of federal or
constitutional rights. Id. at 1337.
The applicability of the doctrine turns on three considerations; first, does the
Plaintiff seek prospective or retrospective relief; second, is the violation ongoing and
continuous; and finally, would equitable relief “‘implicate special sovereignty
interests.’” Id. at 1337 (quoting Coeur d’ Alene, 521 U.S. at 281). Both parties agree
that the first two considerations are easily satisfied. Appellees seek prospective relief
in the form of a permanent injunction for alleged ongoing violations of Title VI.
However, Appellants rely on Seminole Tribe in arguing that the suit implicates
“special sovereignty interests” because Section 602 of Title VI evinces a
congressional intent to avoid Ex Parte Young remedies. Id., 517 U.S. at 59. We are
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not persuaded. First, we have concluded, infra, in Part IV, that a private cause of
action is consonant with Section 602 of Title VI. The Supreme Court also has held
that Title VI’s statutory scheme is not inconsistent with a private right of action, see
Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 704 (1979); Guardians, 463 U.S. at 59293; id. at 620-22 (Marshall, J.); id. at 641-45 (Stevens, J., Brennan, J., Blackmun, J.).
Second, we find no comparison between the intricate remedial scheme of the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”) at issue in Seminole Tribe and Section 602 of Title
VI. Title VI, unlike the IGRA, contains no explicit remedial scheme for private rights
of action. Instead, such suits would be governed by the “general rule” under which
“absent clear direction to the contrary by Congress, the federal courts have the power
to award any appropriate relief in a cognizable cause of action brought pursuant to a
federal statute.” Franklin, 503 U.S. at 70-71. Third, we already have found
injunctive relief to be “appropriate” relief for a private cause of action under the Title
VI framework. See Cone Corp. v. Florida Dep’t of Transp., 921 F.2d 1190, 1201 n.37
(11th Cir. 1991). Fourth, the remedial framework outlined in Title VI applies to grant
and fund terminations by the federal government and not to private suits. See 42
U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Title VI also contains no express limitations on the remedial
powers of federal courts, unlike the IGRA. Compare 42 U.S.C. 2000d-1, with
Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 59-60. Finally, our circuit also has allowed private suits
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to proceed under the doctrine of Ex Parte Young for injunctive relief under Section
504 of the Rehabilitation Act. See, e.g., Lussier v. Dugger, 904 F.2d 661, 670 n.10
(11th Cir. 1991). Section 504 expressly incorporates Title VI remedies, see 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a)(2), and consistently has been construed as being similar to Title VI for
statutory construction purposes. See Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 294-95
(1985).

For these reasons, we conclude that Appellees’ suit is not barred under

Seminole Tribe’s modification of Ex Parte Young.
IV.
Implied Cause of Action
Section 601 of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d,
prohibits any recipient of federal financial assistance from discriminating on the basis
of race, color, or national origin in any federally funded program.16 The Supreme
Court has recognized an implied private cause of action to enforce Section 601. See
Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 293-94 (1985); Guardians Ass’n v. Civil Serv.
Comm’n, 463 U.S. 582, 607 n.27 (1983); id. at 608 n.1 (Powell, J., concurring in
judgment). To state a Section 601claim, just like a claim arising under the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a plaintiff must establish the funding
16

Section 601 of Title VI provides: “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.”
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d.
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recipient’s discriminatory intent. See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293; see also United
States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992); Elston, 997 F.2d at 1405 n.11, 1406;
Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP v. Georgia, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417
(11th Cir. 1985)).
Section 602 of Title VI expressly authorizes federal agencies to promulgate
rules and regulations to effectuate the provisions of Title VI.17 The Supreme Court
17

Section 602 of Title VI provides:
Each Federal department and agency which is empowered to extend
Federal financial assistance to any program or activity, by way of
grant, loan, or contract other than a contract of insurance or guaranty,
is authorized and directed to effectuate the provisions of Section
2000d of this title with respect to such program or activity by issuing
rules, regulations, or orders of general applicability which shall be
consistent with achievement of the objectives of the statute
authorizing the financial assistance in connection with which the
action is taken. No such rule, regulation, or order shall become
effective unless and until approved by the President. Compliance
with any requirement adopted pursuant to this section may be
effected (1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to continue
assistance under such program or activity to any recipient as to whom
there has been an express finding on the record, after opportunity for
hearing, of a failure to comply with such requirement, but such
termination or refusal shall be limited to the particular political entity,
or part thereof, or other recipient as to whom such a finding has been
made and, shall be limited in its effect to the particular program, or
part thereof, in which such noncompliance has been so found, or (2)
by any other means authorized by law: Provided, however, That no
such action shall be taken until the department or agency concerned
has advised the appropriate person or persons of the failure to comply
with the requirement and has determined that compliance cannot be
secured by voluntary means. In the case of any action terminating,
or refusing to grant or continue, assistance because of failure to
comply with a requirement imposed pursuant to this section, the head
of the Federal department or agency shall file with the committees of

35

has held that agencies have the authority to promulgate regulations under Section 602
that prohibit funding recipients from taking any action that results in a disparate
impact or produces discriminatory effects on the basis of race, color, or national
origin. See Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2 (White, J.); id. at 623 n.15 (Marshall, J.);
id. at 642-45 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.); see also Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293;
Lau, 414 U.S. at 568; id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). Here, the parties concede
that the Department of Public Safety is subject to such regulations through monies it
receives both from the Department of Transportation and the Department of Justice.
The relevant regulations state:
A recipient, in determining the types of services, financial
aid, or other benefits, or facilities which will be provided
under any such program, or the class of persons to whom,
or the situations in which, such services, financial aid, other
benefits, or facilities will be provided under any such
program, or the class of persons to be afforded an
opportunity to participate in any such program; may not,
directly or through contractual or other arrangements,
utilize criteria or other methods of administration which
have the effect of subjecting persons to discrimination
because of their race, color, or national origin, or have the
effect of defeating or substantially impairing
accomplishment of the objectives of the program with
the House and Senate having legislative jurisdiction over the program
or activity involved a full written report of the circumstances and the
grounds for such action. No such action shall become effective until
thirty days have elapsed after the filing of such report.
Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 602, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1.
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respect to individuals of a particular race, color, or national
origin.18
49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (Department of Transportation) (emphasis added); 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.104(b)(2) (Department of Justice) (same).
The central issue presented then is whether Appellees may enforce these agency
regulations against Director Hagan and the Department, absent any express statutory
authorization. In other words, we must determine whether there is an implied private
cause of action to enforce agency regulations promulgated under Section 602 of Title
VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d-1. Appellants contend that the
district court erred in holding that a private cause of action exists. We disagree. Our
court has repeatedly recognized an implied private cause of action under Title VI to
enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 602. See
Burton v. City of Belle Glade, 178 F.3d 1175, 1202-03 (11th Cir. 1999); Elston v.
Talladega County Bd. of Educ., 997 F.2d 1394, 1407 (11th Cir. 1993); Georgia State
Conference of Branches of NAACP, 775 F.2d 1403, 1417 (11th Cir. 1985).
Moreover, our circuit precedent is reinforced both by Supreme Court case law and the
uniform position taken by our sister circuits.

18

“Services, financial aid, or other benefits provided under a program receiving Federal
assistance [is defined as] . . . any service, financial aid, or other benefit provided in or through a
facility provided with the aid of Federal financial assistance.” 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(4) (Department
of Transportation); 28 C.F.R. 42.102 (Department of Justice) (same).
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We have recognized an implied private cause of action to enforce disparate
impact regulations arising under Title VI three times. Appellants argue that our
caselaw merely assumes arguendo that such a cause of action exists under Title VI.
We disagree. First, in Georgia State Conference of Branches of NAACP, thirty-five
black schoolchildren sued the Georgia State Board of Education alleging, among
other things, that black students were assigned to programs for the mentally retarded
in a racially discriminatory manner in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment, the
Fourteenth Amendment, and Title VI and its implementing regulations. See Georgia
State, 775 F.2d at 1407-08. The case was tried without a jury and the district court
entered judgment for the defendants on the constitutional and Title VI claims. See id.
at 1408. On appeal, we considered whether the district court properly applied
“disparate impact tests” in evaluating the plaintiffs’ Title VI claim. Id. at 1416. The
defendants, relying on Castaneda v. Pickard, 648 F.2d 989 (5th Cir. Unit A 1981),
argued that Title VI’s nondiscrimination provisions were coextensive with the
Fourteenth Amendment, and required a showing of discriminatory intent for all
private suits. In short, they claimed that disparate impact alone could not support a
finding of Title VI liability. Applying Supreme Court precedent in Guardians and
Alexander, we squarely rejected that theory. In so doing, we observed that Castaneda
no longer was good law on this point because a plurality of Justices in Guardians had
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endorsed the viability of a Title VI disparate impact suit based on administrative
agency regulations. Georgia State, 775 F.2d at 1417 (finding that “five Justices [in
Guardians] were of the opinion that the regulations promulgated under Title VI permit
the filing of suits alleging a disparate impact theory”). We concluded, “[t]here is no
doubt that the plaintiffs predicated this cause of action on the [agency] regulations.
As a result, the district court correctly applied the disparate impact analyses to their
Title VI claims.” Id. We then turned to the merits of the disparate impact analyses
and concluded that the district court’s findings as to the educational soundness of the
defendants’ practices were not clearly erroneous. See id. at 1419. In Georgia State,
we therefore plainly recognized that private plaintiffs may sue to enforce disparate
impact regulations arising under Title VI without a showing of discriminatory intent
as required by Section 601 of Title VI.
Then, in Elston v. Talladega County Board of Education, we reiterated this
point. There, we considered again a private claim brought by a class of black students
and their parents against the Talladega County Board of Education alleging that the
board’s efforts at restructuring its school system violated the First and Fourteenth
Amendments, Title VI and its implementing regulations, and Alabama Code § 36-1240. See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1400. Applying disparate impact analyses, the district
court held, among other things, that because the board’s actions did not have any
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discriminatory effect on blacks, the plaintiffs had failed to demonstrate a violation of
the Title VI regulations. See id. at 1404. On appeal, we assumed arguendo that the
plaintiffs maintained a proper cause of action based on the disparate impact agency
regulations, and we affirmed the judgment of the district court. See id. at 1406-07.
Most recently, in Burton v. City of Belle Glade, we unambiguously recognized
that the black tenants of a housing project could maintain an implied cause of action
to enforce the disparate impact regulations promulgated by the Department of
Agriculture pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI. See Belle Glade, 178 F.3d at 120203. Although we remanded the case to the district court for further proceedings, we
reaffirmed the validity of an implied private cause of action under Section 602.
See id. (observing that “we have recognized an implied private right of action to
enforce the regulations promulgated under section 602 of Title VI”). In short, our
precedent has unambiguously recognized an implied cause of action to enforce
disparate impact regulations promulgated pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI.
Moreover, this view is the consistent position of at least eight other courts of
appeals. Without detailed discussion, seven of our sister circuits have indicated that
an implied private cause of action exists under Section 602. See Buchanan v. City of
Bolivar, Tenn., 99 F.3d 1352, 1356 n.5 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Guardians for the
proposition that “a [private] plaintiff may pursue a claim under a disparate impact
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theory” pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI) (citation omitted); Villanueva v. Carere,
85 F.3d 481, 486 (10th Cir. 1996) (noting “[a]lthough Title VI itself proscribes only
intentional discrimination, certain regulations promulgated pursuant to Title VI
prohibit actions that have a disparate impact on groups protected by the act, even in
the absence of discriminatory intent”) (citation omitted); New York Urban League,
Inc. v. New York, 71 F.3d 1031, 1036 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that “a plaintiff alleging
a violation of the DOT regulations [under Section 602 of Title VI] must make a prima
facie showing that the alleged conduct has a disparate impact”)(citations omitted);
David K. v. Lane, 839 F.2d 1265, 1274 (7th Cir. 1988) (declaring “[i]t is clear that
plaintiffs may maintain a private cause of action to enforce the regulations
promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act. Moreover, plaintiffs need not
show intentional discriminatory conduct to prevail on a claim brought under these
administrative regulations.”)(citation omitted); Castaneda by Castaneda v. Pickard,
781 F.2d 456, 465 n.11 (5th Cir. 1986) (explaining that “a Title VI action can now be
maintained in either the guise of a disparate treatment case, where proof of
discriminatory motive is critical, or in the guise of a disparate impact case. . . . In this
latter type of case, proof of discriminatory intent is not necessary.”) (citation omitted);
Latinos Unidos De Chelsea v. Secretary of Hous. & Dev., 799 F.2d 774, 785 n.20 (1st
Cir. 1986) (noting “under the statute itself, plaintiffs must make a showing of
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discriminatory intent; under the regulations, plaintiffs simply must show a
discriminatory impact”) (citation omitted); Larry P. by Lucile P. v. Riles, 793 F.2d
969, 981-82 (9th Cir. 1984) (finding that “proof of discriminatory effect suffices to
establish liability when the suit is brought to enforce regulations issued pursuant to the
statute rather than the statute itself”) (footnote omitted).
The only other circuit to have addressed the issue in detail also concluded that
an implied private cause of action exists under Section 602 of Title VI. See Chester
Residents Concerned for Quality Living v. Seif, 132 F.3d 925, 936-37 (3d Cir. 1997),
vacated as moot, 119 S. Ct. 22 (1998). In Seif, the Third Circuit read Supreme Court
precedent in Guardians and Alexander to strongly suggest that an implied private
cause of action exists under Section 602. See id. at 929-31. The Seif court then
determined that an implied private right of action was supported both by Title VI’s
legislative scheme and legislative history. See id. at 933-36.
Moreover, our own independent review of Supreme Court case law confirms
the view that Title VI creates a private implied cause of action to enforce the disparate
impact regulations promulgated under Section 602. Although the Court has yet to
squarely answer the question before us, we believe that a close reading of Lau,
Guardians, and Alexander necessarily establishes several holdings logically
supporting an implied private cause of action under Section 602 of Title VI. To begin,
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in Lau, the Supreme Court held that HEW regulations--promulgated pursuant to
Section 602 and establishing a disparate impact standard under Title VI-- were valid
interpretations of Title VI’s substantive contours. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 568 (finding
that HEW regulations authorized a Title VI disparate impact claim under Section
601); id. at 571 (Stewart, J., concurring). As explained earlier, Lau relied on these
agency regulations to recognize a private plaintiff disparate impact suit under Title VI
against a local school district that received federal funds while enforcing a policy of
not providing supplemental language instruction to non-English proficient Asian
students. See id. at 566-68. The HEW regulations relied on in Lau are substantially
similar to the Department of Transportation and Department of Justice regulations of
the instant case.19 Furthermore, the Lau Court also held that these disparate impact
regulations did not exceed the statutory authority of Title VI because they
“‘reasonably related’” to the statute’s antidiscrimination purposes. See id. at 571
(Stewart, J., concurring) (citation omitted). Although Lau rested its holding under
Section 601of Title VI, its outcome and reasoning clearly were based on the
conclusion that agency regulations promulgated under Section 602 could create a
disparate impact standard of liability. See id. at 568; id. at 571 (Stewart, J.,

19

Compare 45 C.F.R. 80.3(b)(1) (HEW), with 49 C.F.R. § 21.5(b)(2) (DOT), and 28 C.F.R.
§ 42.104(b)(2) (DOJ) (same).
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concurring) (noting the “critical question is whether the [Section 602] regulations and
guidelines promulgated by HEW go beyond the authority of Section 601").
Five Justices in Guardians reaffirmed this holding of Lau.20 Guardians also
involved a private suit by black and Hispanic police officers alleging, inter alia, that
their department’s lay-off policy violated Title VI. In a plurality opinion, five Justices
endorsed the view that Section 602 implementing regulations could support
declaratory or injunctive relief for private plaintiffs under Title VI. See Alexander,
469 U.S. at 293; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 (White, J.); id. at 615 (Marshall, J.); id.
at 641-45 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.). While the Justices did not explicitly
address whether an implied private right of action existed under Section 602, their
analysis strongly supports recognizing such a right. All five of the plurality members
would allow private plaintiffs to sue for injunctive or declaratory relief on the basis
of Section 602 disparate impact regulations that prohibit recipients of federal funds

20

The Lau holding was indirectly questioned in Bakke where a majority of the Supreme
Court joined a concurrence that read Title VI’s provisions as co-extensive with the Fourteenth
Amendment. See Regents of the Univ. of Ca. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 325 (1978) (noting that “Title
VI goes no further in prohibiting the use of race than the Equal Protection Clause”). One year
earlier, the Supreme Court in Arlington Heights had reaffirmed the Washington v. Davis holding
that equal protection violations of the Fourteenth Amendment required a showing of discriminatory
intent. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Housing. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 264 (1977)
(citing Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-44 (1976)). Lau’s recognition of a disparate impact
theory of liability under Title VI implementing regulations seemed at odds with this Bakke dicta.
Guardians settled this question by reaffirming that, when based on federal agency regulations
promulgated under Section 602 authority, a disparate impact cause of action for declaratory and
injunctive relief by private plaintiffs could be maintained.
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from enforcing policies with discriminatory effects on protected minority groups. See
id. at 584, 589-93 (White, J.); id. at 615 (Marshall, J.); id. at 641-45 (Stevens,
Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.). Moreover, the agency regulations supporting this private
cause of action are promulgated under the authority of Section 602 of Title VI to
“effectuate” the statute’s purposes as outlined in Section 601. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000d1.
Finally, this inference also draws support from the language of the plurality
opinions. In announcing the decision, Justice White explained:
the threshold issue before the Court is whether the private
plaintiffs in this case need to prove discriminatory intent to
establish a violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, and administrative implementing regulations
promulgated thereunder. I conclude, as do four other
Justices, in separate opinions, that the Court of Appeals
erred in requiring proof of discriminatory intent. However,
I conclude that the judgment below should be affirmed on
other grounds, because, in the absence of discriminatory
animus, compensatory relief should not be awarded to
private Title VI plaintiffs; unless discriminatory intent is
shown, declaratory and limited injunctive relief should be
the only available private remedies for Title VI violations.
Id. at 584 (emphasis added). Justice White’s crucial fifth vote unambiguously
contemplated the right of private plaintiffs to obtain injunctive and declaratory relief
under disparate impact agency regulations promulgated under the authority of Section
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602. The opinions of the four other plurality members also support a similar
interpretation. Writing for himself, Justice Marshall explained that he would reaffirm
Lau in full and allow private parties the right to sue under Title VI for disparate
impact claims. See id. at 623-24. The three other plurality members also indicated
support for a private party suit to enforce Section 602 agency regulations prohibiting
disparate impact violations-- albeit on different grounds. They reasoned that the
Section 602 disparate impact regulations constitute “valid federal law” and that private
parties may sue under Section 1983 to obtain both injunctive and compensatory relief
for violations of the regulations’ terms. See id. at 645 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun,
JJ.). In Guardians, the plaintiffs sued under Section 1983 to enforce Title VI and did
not base their cause of action on Section 602 alone.21 Justice Stevens’ opinion omitted
a discussion of whether an implied cause of action exists under Section 602
regulations, noting in a footnote that the issue was not presented directly before them.
See id. at 645 n.18. However, despite this caveat, his opinion endorsed all of the
analytical predicates necessary for recognizing an implied private cause of action
under Section 602. It agreed that (1) disparate impact regulations, (2) promulgated
under Section 602 authority, (3) represent valid federal law (4) consonant with Title

21

In this case, plaintiffs relied on Section 602 directly rather than basing their cause of action
on Section 1983.
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VI’s legislative scheme (5) and legislative history, and (6) may be enforced by private
parties (7) to obtain declaratory, injunctive, or compensatory relief. See id. at 64145.22 We therefore read Guardians to suggest strongly the existence of an implied
private cause of action under Section 602.23
22

These findings prompted the conclusion:

[We] would hold that a court has broad discretion to remedy
violations of Title VI in actions brought by private parties . . .
[b]ecause the relief petitioners received was available to them under
Title VI, and because that relief was justified without proof of
discriminatory intent. . . . [Although] the petitioners had to prove that
respondents’ actions were motivated by an invidious intent in order
to prove a violation of the statute, they only had to show that the
respondents were producing discriminatory effects in order to prove
a violation of valid federal law.
Id. at 645 (Stevens, Brennan, Blackmun, JJ.)
23

This conclusion also draws reinforcement from dicta in Alexander. In Alexander, a private
party disparate impact suit brought under federal agency implementing regulations pursuant to
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, a unanimous Supreme Court offered a clarification
of the Guardians holding.
First, the Court held that Title VI itself directly reached only
instances of intentional discrimination. Second, the Court held that
actions having an unjustifiable disparate impact on minorities could
be redressed through agency regulations designed to implement the
purposes of Title VI. In essence, then, we held that Title VI had
delegated to the agencies in the first instance the complex
determination of what sorts of disparate impacts upon minorities
constituted sufficiently significant social problems, and were read
enough remediable, to warrant altering the practices of the federal
grantees that had produced those impacts.
See Alexander, 469 U.S. at 293-94. Moreover, in applying the Guardians holding to the facts of
Alexander, the Court also explained that “to the extent our holding in Guardians is relevant to the
interpretation of § 504, Guardians suggests that the regulations implementing § 504, upon which
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In short, we read Lau, Guardians, and Alexander, in pari materia, to logically
support finding an implied private cause of action under Section 602.24 These cases
establish three important holdings: (1) disparate impact regulations promulgated
pursuant to Section 602 of Title VI constitute an authoritative construction of Title
VI’s antidiscrimination provisions; (2) private parties may enforce these regulations
to obtain declaratory and injunctive relief; and (3) Title VI’s legislative history and
scheme unequivocally support an implied cause of action under Section 601 and
Section 602. For these reasons, we conclude that an implied private cause of action

respondents in part rely, could make actionable the disparate impact challenged in this case.” Id.
at 294 (emphasis added). The opinion explained its hesitancy in applying Guardians directly to
Alexander by distinguishing the legislative history and case law surrounding Title VI and Section
504. See id. at 295 & n.11. Nevertheless, the treatment of Guardians in Alexander suggests that the
Guardians plurality supported a private cause of action based on the implementing regulations. Any
other conclusion would be inconsistent with the claim in Alexander that Guardians lends support
for the notion that the implementing regulations of Section 504 could create a private disparate
impact cause of action. Only if Guardians recognized or strongly supported an implied cause of
action based on Title VI agency regulations would the decision lend support for finding an implied
cause of action under agency regulations promulgated under a statute similar to Title VI.
24

Appellants argue that the Supreme Court in United States v. Fordice overruled Guardians
and Lau in a footnote of an opinion authored by Justice White, the crucial fifth vote for the
Guardians plurality. The footnote states, “private petitioners reiterate in this Court their assertion
that the state system also violates Title VI, citing a regulation to that statute which requires States
to ‘take affirmative action to overcome the effects of past discrimination.’ Our cases makes clear,
and the parties do not disagree, that the reach of Title VI’s protection extends no further than the
Fourteenth Amendment.” United States v. Fordice, 505 U.S. 717, 732 n.7 (1992) (citations omitted).
Although the footnote references agency regulations, the discrimination involved in Fordice centered
on intentional discrimination in college education and not disparate impact discrimination. While
not altogether clear, we believe the footnote merely confirms that a Title VI suit, based on the statute
alone, must prove intentional discrimination similar to an Equal Protection claim. Nor are we
persuaded that the Supreme Court would have overruled Guardians without any discussion of its
precedent and in so oblique a manner as suggested by Appellants.
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exists under Section 602 of Title VI.
V.
Disparate Impact on the Basis of National Origin
Having determined that Appellees were not barred procedurally from bringing
a Title VI suit against the Alabama Department of Public Safety, we address the merits
of the case. Appellees’ suit lies strictly under a disparate impact theory of liability.
In prior cases, our circuit has applied explicitly Title VII’s disparate impact framework
to Title VI disparate impact suits. See Elston, 997 F.2d 1407 & n.14; Georgia State,
775 F.2d at 1417.
Under the Title VI disparate impact framework, plaintiffs are required to prove
“by a preponderance of the evidence that a facially neutral practice has a
disproportionate adverse effect on a group protected by Title VI.” Elston, 997 F.2d
at 1407.

Once a prima facie showing is made, a defendant must prove that a

“substantial legitimate justification” exists for the challenged practice. Id. If a
defendant meets this burden, a plaintiff still may prevail by demonstrating that a
“comparably

effective

alternative

practice

which

would

result

in

less

disproportionality” exists, or that the “defendant’s proffered justification is a pretext
for discrimination.” Id. See Georgia State, 775 F.2d at 1417. We apply this
framework to the district court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law.
49

In a detailed order, the trial court marshaled an array of evidence to support its
conclusion that the English-only driver’s license exam policy, although a facially
neutral classification, exerted a disparate impact on the basis of national origin.
Appellants, in fact, do not contest any of the district court’s findings of fact-- either as
to the disparate impact of the policy on non-English speaking license applicants or the
pretextual nature of the policy justifications offered by the State. Instead, Appellants
challenge only the district court’s conclusions of law. Specifically, Appellants argue
that an English language policy, even if exerting a disparate impact on the basis of
national origin, cannot ever constitute national origin discrimination. We conclude
otherwise.
The district court’s findings of fact establish that the English language policy
for driver’s license exams has a statewide disparate impact on Alabama residents of
foreign descent. To prove disparate impact, a plaintiff must demonstrate three essential
elements: first, a facially neutral policy casts an effect on a statutorily-protected group;
second, the effect is adverse; and finally, the effect is disproportionate. See Elston, 997
F.2d at 1407. The district court’s factual findings satisfy each of these three elements.
In the course of the bench trial, the district court heard substantial evidence relating to
the history, implementation, and effect of Appellants’ English-only exam policy.
Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1291-95. On the basis of this evidence, the court made three
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central findings. First, it concluded that as many as 13,000 Alabama residents cannot
obtain driver’s licenses as a result of the English-only test requirement. See id. at
1282. Appellants do not dispute that the inability to drive a car adversely affects
individuals in the form of lost economic opportunities, social services, and other
quality of life pursuits. Second, the district court found that of “all [the] legal residents
of the State of Alabama who are otherwise qualified to obtain a Class D private vehicle
driver’s license but cannot do so because they are not sufficiently fluent in English, .
. . [a] vast majority. . . are from a country of origin other than the United States.”25
Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1283 (emphasis added). Third, the court determined that
while no reasonable accommodations were made for non-English speaking applicants,
other applicant groups, such as disabled and deaf drivers, received substantial
assistance in taking the driving exam. See id. at 1287-90. Notably, the Department
also made special test accommodations for illiterate English speakers who, just like
non-English speakers of foreign descent, cannot proficiently read highway signs in
English. The court also found that licensed drivers from other states and countries
25

This result should not be surprising in light of statistics correlating language with national
origin cited by the district court. See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1282. Of those who speak Spanish
in the United States, 97% are Hispanic. See id. The court also cited the testimony of researcher of
Edward Chen showing that “the correlation between language and national origin is also very high.”
As of 1989, 72.5% of Chinese Americans speak a language other than English at home. Comparable
figures for other Asian Pacific Islander groups exists for Cambodians (81.9%), Vietnamese (80.7%),
Laotians (77.4%), Thai (72.5%), Koreans (69.7%), Filipinos (59.9%), Indians (55.3%), and Japanese
(40.5%). See Sandoval, 7 F. Supp.2d at 1282.
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were able to obtain an Alabama driver’s license without having to take the
Department’s written exam-- irrespective of their fluency in the English language.
These factual findings demonstrate that Appellants’ policy significantly impacts
Alabama residents of foreign descent, in both an adverse and disproportionate manner.
On appeal, Appellants do not dispute the adverse, disparate impact their English-only
policy visits on Alabama residents of foreign descent.
Nevertheless, Appellants contend, as a matter of law, that a discriminatory
language policy cannot constitute a disparate impact based on national origin. Their
argument rests on a single premise: language never has been held to be a proxy for
national origin for purposes of proving intentional discrimination. This argument is
misplaced.

Appellees’ Title VI claim does not require a showing of intentional

discrimination on the part of Appellants. Indeed, Appellees do not argue now that
Appellants’ driver’s license policy masked discriminatory animus or acted as a proxy
for such animus. Appellees’ Title VI claim does not implicate the Equal Protection
Clause or Section 601 of Title VI, but instead concerns the disparate impact provisions
of Section 602 of Title VI. While existent case law is unclear as to whether language
may serve as a proxy for intentional national origin discrimination claims of either a
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constitutional or statutory nature,26 this question is tangential to disparate impact
analysis.
Our circuit unambiguously has held that disparate impact suits under Section
602 involve no intent requirement. See Belle Glade, 178 F.3d at 1201-03 (citing
Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407; Georgia State, 775 F.2d at 1417); cf. Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (explaining that Title VII disparate impact suits are

26

The Supreme Court never has held that language may serve as a proxy for national origin
for equal protection analysis. However, in the context of jury selection, the Court surmised that “it
may well be, for certain ethnic groups and in some communities, that proficiency in a particular
language, like skin color, should be treated as a surrogate for race under an equal protection
analysis.” Hernandez v. New York, 500 U.S. 352, 371-72 (1991). It also has observed the close
nexus between language and national origin in other dicta. See Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414
U.S. 86, 92-93 & n.5 (1973) (noting that while there was no evidence of national origin
discrimination, there also was “no suggestion, for example, that the company refused to hire aliens
of Mexican or Spanish-speaking background while hiring those of other national origins”);
Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284, 298 (1927) (observing that “the Constitution protects . . .
[the Japanese] as well as those who speak another tongue”). Our circuit also has reached this
conclusion in dicta in two prior cases. See United States v. Uvalde Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist., 625
F.2d 547, 553 (5th Cir. 1980) (stating that “the Fourteenth Amendment clearly extends to protection
of any group of persons invidiously discriminated against by state law including groups identifiable
by ethnic, national origin, or linguistic characteristics”) (emphasis added); Gloor, 618 F.2d 264, 270
(5th Cir. 1980) (noting that “to a person who speaks only one tongue or has difficulty using another
language than the one spoken in his own home, language might well be an immutable characteristic
like skin color, sex, or place of birth”). Several other federal circuits have drawn similar conclusions
about the connection between language and national origin. See Yniguez v. Arizonans for Official
English, 69 F.3d 920, 947-48 (9th Cir. 1995), vacated on other grounds, 520 U.S. 43 (1997) (finding
that “since language is a close and meaningful proxy for national origin, restrictions on the use of
languages may mask discrimination against specific national origin groups, or more generally,
conceal nativist sentiment”); Carino v. University of Oklahoma Bd. of Regents, 750 F.2d 815, 81819 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding that employment termination, because of foreign accent, constituted
national origin discrimination); Berke v. Ohio Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 628 F.2d 980, 981 (6th Cir.
1980) (per curiam) (determining that refusal to hire based on foreign accent amounted to Title VII
discrimination on the basis of national origin). We refrain from reaching this question since this
case does not involve either a statutory or constitutional claim concerning intentional discrimination.
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directed at the “consequences of employment practices”). Under this cause of action,
unlike a claim arising under Section 601, “a plaintiff may obtain injunctive or
declaratory relief by showing, among other things, that the challenged action has a
‘disparate impact on groups protected by the statute, even if those actions are not
intentionally discriminatory.’” Belle Glade, 178 F.3d at 1202 (quoting Elston, 997 F.2d
at 1406) (citing Alexander, 469 U.S. at 292-94; Guardians, 463 U.S. at 584 n.2;
Georgia State Conference, 775 F.2d at 1417). Therefore, whether the English-only
driver’s license policy acted as a proxy for targeting residents of foreign descent is
irrelevant under a Section 602 suit for injunctive relief. Plaintiffs instead must prove
that the “facially neutral practice [of requiring English-only driving exams] has a
disproportionate adverse effect on a group protected by Title VI [in this case, national
origin].” Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 (citing Georgia State, 775 F.2d at 1417).
In short, the district court properly applied our circuit’s disparate impact
standard, and concluded that Appellees had presented a prima facie case of disparate
impact on the basis of national origin. Moreover, the district court determined that
Appellants’ stated justifications for the English-only policy were a pretext. Appellants
do not contest this finding. Therefore, we can find no error in the district court’s
conclusion of law that the English-only policy evinces an unlawful disparate impact
based on national origin.
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Moreover, as discussed earlier, both Supreme Court precedent and longstanding
congressional provisions and federal agency regulations have repeatedly instructed
state entities for decades that a nexus exists between language and national origin. In
Lau, a school district, that received federal funds, was adjudged liable under Title VI
disparate impact regulations for an English language policy that adversely affected
non-English-speaking Chinese students. See Lau, 414 U.S. at 567-68. In ordering the
district to take “affirmative steps” to rectify the policy’s effects on “national originminority group children,” the Supreme Court explicitly struck down the policy as
unlawful national origin discrimination under Title VI. See id. Shortly after Lau,
Congress ratified the Lau holding in its Education Amendments of 1974. There,
Congress explained:
[T]he Federal government, as exemplified by Title VI of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, . . . has a special and continuing
obligation to ensure that States and local school districts
take appropriate action to provide equal educational
opportunities to children and youth of limited English
proficiency.
20 U.S.C. 7402 (a)(15). The Department of Justice then issued Title VI implementing
regulations for all executive agencies, requiring grant recipients to provide foreign
language assistance,
[w]here a significant number or proportion of the population
eligible to be served or likely to be directly affected by a
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federally assisted program (e.g., affected by relocation)
needs service or information in a language other than
English in order effectively to be informed of or to
participate in the program . . . . This requirement applies
with regard to written material of the type which is
ordinarily distributed to the public.
28 C.F.R. 42,405(d)(1) (1976). Both the Departments of Education and Health and
Human Services also have connected language and national origin. See 24 C.F.R. Part
100, App. B. at IV. L & M, V.D., VI.B. (Department of Education) (instructing federal
fund recipients to accommodate students with limited English proficiency in order to
avoid unlawful national origin discrimination under Title VI); 45 Fed. Reg. 82,972
(1980) (Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Health and Human Services)
(concluding that grant recipients “have an obligation under Title VI to communicate
effectively with persons of limited English proficiency”).

Finally, since 1980, the

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission has warned state entities that Englishonly rules constrain “opportunities on the basis of national origin” and that the
implementation of such rules constitutes a prima facie case of national origin
discrimination. 29 C.F.R. § 1606.7(a).27 These agency regulations in concert with Lau
27

Because the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission is the administrative agency in
charge of enforcing Title VII, its Title VII interpretations long have been accorded substantial
deference. See Albermale Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 431 (1975) (citing Griggs, 401 U.S.
at 433-34)). But see Spun Steak, 998 F.2d at 1498-1500 (rejecting the EEOC’s English-only
guideline). Our circuit has adopted Title VII case law in its Title VI disparate impact jurisprudence.
See Elston, 997 F.2d at 1407 n.14; Georgia State, 775 F.2d at 1417.
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reinforce the district court’s conclusion of law that Appellants’ English-only policy
violates Title VI by creating an adverse, disproportionate impact on non-English
speaking Alabama residents who wish to obtain a driver’s license.
VI.
In sum, we hold that Appellees’ suit is not barred under the Eleventh
Amendment, that Section 602 of Title VI creates an implied private cause of action to
obtain injunctive and declaratory relief under federal regulations prohibiting disparate
impact discrimination against statutorily protected groups, and that the district court
did not err in deciding, on the merits, that the Appellants’ English-only official policy
constituted a disparate impact on the basis of national origin. Accordingly, we
AFFIRM the district court order granting injunctive relief to Appellees.
AFFIRMED.

57

